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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO NOTICE UPON
DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
In Norton v. National Bank of Commerce,' the Arkansas Supreme Court
attempted to assess the relative rights and duties of three parties engaged in
two secured transactions. Since the validity of the court's reasoning is open
to some doubt, and since section 1-102(1) (c) of the Code might lead other
courts to follow this case for the sake of uniformity, the opinion deserves
serious attention.
The defendant in this litigation was a dealer in used automobiles who
sold a 1957 Oldsmobile to one Goldsmith. Goldsmith, who was not a party to
this action, executed a promissory note and a conditional sales contract for
the purchase price. The dealer negotiated the note and assigned the contract
to the plaintiff bank under a written contract of assignment. Under the terms
of the contract, which the bank had drafted and used regularly in this kind of
financing, the transaction took the form of a sale of the chattel paper. It was
provided, however, that upon demand by the bank, the dealer would repur-
chase the chattel paper for the amount remaining due thereon. 2 It was also
provided that the dealer "waived" all demands and notices to which he might
otherwise have been entitled, and that the bank's remedy of compelling re-
purchase was not exclusive, but cumulative. 5
Notwithstanding this last clause, it was the bank's customary practice
to exercise its remedy of repurchase before taking any other action. 4 When
Goldsmith defaulted, however, the bank made no such demand and, without
giving notice to either Goldsmith or the dealer, it repossessed the car and
resold it at a private sale. The purchaser, one of the bank's customers, paid
$75.00, leaving a deficiency of $277.88. Upon the dealer's refusal to pay the
deficiency, the bank sued him for the amount still due on the note, claiming
that he was obligated to pay because of the repurchase agreement. The trial
court entered judgment for the bank, and the dealer appealed on the ground
that, under section 9-504(3) of the Code, the bank should have given him
notice of the proposed disposition, and that the bank's failure to do so had
discharged his entire liability.
In considering the dealer's claim that he should have been notified, the
Arkansas Supreme Court referred to section 9-504(3) 5 which provides that
"unless collateral is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market ...
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor ...." The only issue to be decided, then, was whether the dealer was
' a "debtor" as to the collateral disposed of, that is, the automobile.
1 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966).
2 Id. at 539.
3 Brief of Joe C. Barrett, Esq. as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, quoting language from the
contract.
4 398 5.W.2d at 539.
5 Id. at 540.
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As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the bank's contention that a
used car fails within the exception for goods "customarily sold on a recog-
nized market."8
 Then the court proceeded to the central issue by focusing
upon the Code's definition of "debtor" as set forth in section 9-105(d):
"Debtor means the person who owes payment or other performance of the
obligation secured . . . and includes the seller of . . . chattel paper." In con-
struing this language, the court, in effect, held that, as the seller of chattel
paper who had promised to repurchase it, the dealer owed "other performance"
of Goldsmith's obligation. Having thus been characterized as a debtor, the
dealer was held to have been entitled to notice under section 9-504(3).?
Tangentially, the court also dismissed the bank's contention that the
dealer had waived his right to notice, holding that, under section 9-501(3),
the attempted waiver was ineffective. 8 The court did not, however, accept
the dealer's claim that the bank's failure to notify him had discharged his
entire liability. The court noted that section 9-507(1) provides only that if
a secured party has disposed of the collateral in a manner not in accordance
with the Code, "any person entitled to notification . . . has a right to re-
cover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the
provisions of the Code."9 It is clear that what is recoverable under this
section is the actual provable loss which is by no means the entire liability
in every case. The court went beyond this provision, however, and stated
that the bank's wrongful disposition of the collateral had made it difficult,
if not impossible, for the dealer to prove the extent of his loss with reasonable
certainty. Therefore, the court would assume that the value of the collateral
had been equivalent to the amount of the debt, thus shifting to the bank the
burden of proving the extent of the dealer's loss.i°
The opinion in the instant case raises three issues which must be
examined in some detail. First, it is necessary to consider whether sections
9-105(d) and 9-504(3) will support the court's conclusion that the dealer
was a debtor entitled to notice. Second, if the dealer is not such a debtor,
it will be necessary to determine the character of the relationship between
the dealer and the bank. Finally, no matter what the relationship, there is a
question as to what, if any, liability the bank has incurred in disposing
of the collateral in this manner.
In evaluating the court's conclusion that the dealer was a debtor en-
titled to notice, the essential consideration is that there were two secured
transactions. The first was between Goldsmith and the dealer to secure the
purchase of the automobile, and the second was between the dealer and the
bank to secure the dealer's promise to repurchase. It is submitted that under
6
 Ibid.
7 Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 541.
9 Id. at 541-42.
10 The court explicitly rejected the positions set forth in the two amicus briefs it had
requested. The briefs were filed by Harry E. Meek, Esq. and Joe C. Barrett, Esq., both of
the Arkansas Bar. Mr. Barrett was assisted by Professor Soia Mentschikoff, Professor
Robert Braucher, and Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., members of the Permanent Editorial
Board of the Uniform Commercial Code. These briefs were extremely valuable in the
preparation of this comment.
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section 9-504(3), the debtor in the second secured transaction is not
necessarily entitled to notice upon disposition of the collateral of the first.
Rather, as that section indicates, to be entitled to notice of the disposition of
collateral, one must be a debtor in the sense that he owes payment or other
performance of the obligation secured by that collateral. It is not enough to
be a debtor on a separate, though related, transaction. To concede that the
dealer is a debtor as the seller of the chattel paper is only to raise the material
question whether he was a debtor as to the automobile—whether he owed
payment or other performance of Goldsmith's obligation. Before considering
this question, however, it is particularly important to establish exactly what
the parties had, in fact, agreed to do.
In construing the agreement between the bank and the dealer, one part
of the Code which must be kept in mind is section 1-205(3), which provides
that "a course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the
vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should
be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an
agreement." In this locale, it was the standard practice of the commercial
financing business, and the customary procedure of this bank as well, to
offer the chattel paper to the assignor before any disposition of the buyer's
collateral. 11 Further, the dealer in the instant case had always fulfilled his
obligation to repurchase upon request,' 2 and this was the first time that
the bank had deviated from this standard business practice. It seems clear,
then, that this practice of offering the chattel paper for repurchase before
disposition of the car had become part of the "usage of trade" 13 and "course
of dealing"14 between the parties. In view of this fact, it is submitted that
the result contemplated by the parties was not that the dealer would be a
debtor, but that he would resume the status of secured party. That this
was their expectation can be demonstrated most clearly by examining the
implications of the standard methods of loan financing and then examining the
relationships in the instant case.
Consider first the simplest type of loan financing in which a dealer sells
an automobile on credit for $1,000. Assume that the buyer is obligated to
make payments to the dealer on the first of each month for twelve months,
and that the dealer subsequently pledges this obligation to a bank as security
for a short-term, single-payment loan of $500 due six months later. Clearly,
the dealer's obligation to repay his loan would be a duty assumed as a part
of his transaction with the bank. There is no difficulty in distinguishing the
two transactions and it is obvious that, as pledgor of the chattel paper, the
dealer is a debtor as to his own obligation which is secured by the chattel
paper, not by the automobile.
Second, consider another loan transaction with somewhat different
terms. Assume the same contract between the buyer and the dealer for
the conditional sale of the automobile. If, however, the dealer borrowed
$1,000, instead of $500, and contracted to repay the bank in twelve install-
11 398 S.W.2d at 539.
12 Ibid.
§ 1 -205(2). All citations to the Code are to the 1962 Official Text.
14 U.C.C. I 1-205(1).
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ments, payable on the first of each month, the following would occur.
On the first of each month, the buyer would pay the dealer and the dealer
would pay the bank. Obviously, since the terms of this transaction between
the dealer and the bank are so similar to those between the buyer and the
dealer, it would be more convenient to eliminate this intermediate step by
having the buyer pay the bank directly. If such an arrangement were made,
however, it would be simply a matter of form and, if the buyer defaulted, he
would be defaulting on his debt to the dealer, who would continue to pay
the bank, not as a surety on the buyer's obligation, but as principal obligor
on his own.
In both forms of loan financing presented above, the dealer is not a debtor
on the buyer's obligation, but, as to the buyer, he is a secured party. In the
instant case, the dealer did not pledge the chattel paper, but he assigned it to
the bank together with a promise to repurchase it on the buyer's default for
an amount equivalent to that still owed by the buyer. 15 In this situation, the
buyer pays the bank, not as a result of commercial convenience, but because
the bank has assumed the dealer's position as creditor. It is critical to note,
however, that, in the end, this arrangement is designed to have the same
practical effect as loan financing. In this case, as well as in the straight loan
transaction, the dealer's obligation runs to the hank, and his recourse is against
the buyer's collateral. In the straight loan transaction, the dealer is always
the secured party vis-à-vis the buyer, and, in the instant case, he has con-
tracted to resume the status of secured party by repurchasing the chattel
paper. The dealer did not owe "other performance" of Goldsmith's obligation,
and he was thus not a debtor as to the automobile. He was not, therefore,
entitled to notice upon its disposition.
Of course, the fact that the bank had no duty to give notice does not
mean that the bank had no duty at all. It is necessary to examine further the
terms of this security agreement, as qualified by section 1-205, to determine
what other duties the bank might have owed to the dealer. In addition, it is
also necessary to consider how the dealer's duty to repurchase was affected
by the bank's disposition of the automobile. As shown above, the bank should
have given the dealer an opportunity to repurchase the chattel paper before
it disposed of the automobile. By its express terms, the security agreement
obligated the dealer to repurchase on demand, but by virtue of section 1-205,
it also obligated the bank to offer the chattel paper before any disposition of
the automobile. 16 Clearly the bank had a right to compel repurchase of the
chattel paper, but if it sought to hold the dealer fully liable, it also had a
duty to offer the paper before disposing of the automobile. Thus, the bank
may have damaged the dealer, not by failing to notify him of the proposed
sale, but by deviating from its "course of dealing" in not giving him an op-
portunity to repurchase the chattel paper before disposition. This breach of the
bank's obligation would not, however, cause a discharge of the dealer's obliga-
tion. Under this agreement, the dealer's duty to repurchase continued even
15 398 S.W.2d at 539.
la See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d
720, aff'd, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780, (1961).
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after the disposition of the automobile, for it does not appear that the contract
made his duty contingent upon the preservation of the automobile as collat-
eral. Certainly, neither the court nor the litigants have indicated that this was
their view of the transaction, and, therefore, in the instant case, the dealer
would be able to counterclaim for the damages arising from the bank's
failure to offer the chattel paper before disposition of the automobile." This,
however, raises the separate issue of how these damages should be ascertained.
Under the court's analysis, or under the position taken in this comment,
the court is correct in holding that the bank's improper disposition would
not cause a discharge of the dealer's liability. There is a real question, how-
ever, as to whether section 9-507 is applicable, and, if so, there is further
doubt as to the court's shifting of the burden of proof. If the court were
correct in holding that the dealer was a debtor entitled to notice under section
9-504(3), then section 9-507 would apply; but that section allows only
the recovery of actual damages and does not provide for any discharge. In
the few decisions which have treated this issue, the courts have generally
held that no discharge should be imposed, and that recovery should be
limited to actual damages."
It does not seem, however, that the dealer would be entitled to recover
under section 9-507, for this section indicates that recovery from the secured
party is limited to "loss caused by failure to comply with the provisions of this
Part," that is, Part 5 of Article 9. The dealer's right to repurchase the chattel
paper before disposition was a right guaranteed by the implicit terms of
this particular security agreement; it was not a right under Part 5 of
Article 9, such as the right to notification given by section 9-504(3). There-
fore, the bank's failure to give the dealer an opportunity to repurchase was a
breach of their contract rather than a violation of a Code requirement.
Strictly speaking, then, section 9-507 does not control the question of the
dealer's damages, and, assuming no contrary statutory provision, this question
could be decided on a non-Code breach of contract theory. If the court had
held that the dealer was not a debtor, but that the rights and liabilities of these
parties arose from their contract, and, if the dealer's damages are in fact
so difficult to ascertain, then perhaps the court's theory of shifting the burden
of proof would be a more equitable solution. If, however, the court was apply-
ing section 9-507, this shift of the burden of proof was clearly not called for
by the statutory language. Under the Code, it is generally the •complaining
party, here the dealer, who has the duty of showing not only the violation of
the Code, but also the extent of the resulting loss."
The end result of this litigation may weIl turn out to be correct in terms
17
 This is analogous to the loan arrangement. If the bank had improperly discounted
the dealer's chattel paper to a third party, the dealer would not be discharged from his
obligation to the bank, but he could recover any damages caused by the bank's improper
disposition.
18 E.g., Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961) ;
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1960). Contra, Associates
Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965).
19
 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 8.06 (1966).
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of apportioning the financial loss. If it does, however, it will be the result
of good fortune rather than a proper interpretation of the Code. The dealer
was not a debtor entitled to notice of disposition of the automobile, but he
was damaged by the bank's failure to offer the chattel paper before disposi-
tion. He was thus entitled to recover actual damages, but he was not entitled
to a discharge of his liability. The court's treatment of the damages question
does violence to section 9-507(1), but perhaps an accurate damages award
will be made anyway. Despite the Code's mandate for uniformity,2° it seems




 U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (c).
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